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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE ST~\TE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Resp,ondent 
YS. 
ROBERT "\VILLIA~I DYETT and 
ERNEST F. LLOYD, 
Defenclants and Appellwnts. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATE:\fENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7173 
The respondent agrees that the appellant's State-
ment of Facts is correct so far as related but that it is 
incomplete and feels that the facts as stated below should 
be called to the attention of this court. 
The defendants in this case were charged with the 
crime of larceny of an automobile. They were tried in 
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the District Court in and for Salt Lake County, state of 
Utah and convicted by a jury. There is no question but 
that the CJar involved had been stolen. 'The defendants 
make no contention to the contrary and the respondents 
feel that the evidence is too complete relative to this 
issue to consume time and space proving the matter. As 
to the question of possession and whether or not the car 
was within the possession and control of the defendants 
we desire to call attention to the following facts. 
The defendants were arrested and taken into custody 
on a Sunday. 'The officers became suspicious of the de-
fendants' -actions when the defendants were observed 
tinkering with the automobiles on a used car lot known as 
the Brown Motor Company located at 833 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Certain cars were on dis-
play at this address for public observance hut being a 
Sunday it was not open for business and the owner was 
not pres•ent. Upon investigation the officers found that 
defendant Dyett was tinkering with the front license 
plate of a Ford automobile located in the front of the 
auto lot. The nuts and screws holding the plate had been 
removed and were laying on the ground. The rear plate 
of the Ford automobile had been completely removed and 
was not to be found near the Ford automobile. Dyett 
stated that he was inspecting the plates and that one of 
the reasons he was on the premises was that he had 
formerly worked for Mr. Brown, owner of the lot. This 
was later testified to by Mr. Brown as being incorrect. 
Defendant Llyod was found at the rear of this auto-
mobile lot some short distance from defendant Dyett, 
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crouching in front of the stolen Dodge coupe. The other 
license plate belonging to the Ford automobile was found 
with the securing bolts laying on the ground just in 
front of the stolen 1947 Dodge Coupe which as admitted 
by the defendants in their brief was on the car lot at 
the time the defendants were observed by the officers. 
:Mr. Lloyd gave a wrong name at the time of being 
questioned and later gave his correct name. There were 
no license plates on the stolen Dodge car. Defendant 
Lloyd gave no reason for being on the lot or near the 
stolen automobile. In fact neither defendant made any 
explanation as to their reasons for being on the auto-
mobile lot nor their activities in relation to the stolen 
Dodge car and defendant Dyett refused to make any 
statement without talking to his attorney. Later testi-
mony by the owner of the lot, Mr. Brown, identified the 
license plates which were found in front of the stolen 
Dodge and which were partly removed from the Ford, as 
the license plates that belonged to the Ford automobile. 
lf r. Brown testified that Dyett had at no time been in 
his employ and that neither defendant had any authority 
from hin1 to remove the license plates. (See Transcript 
pages 101-121). 
ARGUMENT 
WAS THE STOLEN DODGE AUTOMOBILE SUF-
FICIENTLY WITHIN THE POSSESSION OF THE 
DEFENDANTS SO THAT AN EXPLANATION 
COULD BE DEMANDED FROM 'THEM AS TO 
WHERE THEY HAD OBTAINED SAID POSSES-
SION. 
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Larceny is defined in the Laws of Utah in Section 
103-36-1 Utah Code Annotated 1943 as follows: 
''Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, 
carrying, leading or driving away the personal 
property of another. Possession of property re-
cently stolen, when the person in possession fails 
to make a satisfactory explanation, shall be 
deemed prima facie evidence of guilt.'' 
Respectfuly submitted, 
As indicated, the respondents feel that there can be 
no question but that larceny had been committed. The 
Dodge car had been stolen from the North Temple Gar-
age and taken without authority by someone. There were 
no witnesses to testify that the defendants in this case 
had taken the automobile. In other words no one was 
found to testify that they had seen thes~e defendants take 
the car but the respondents still contend that the stolen 
car was found in their possession. Therefore, the only 
evidence necessary would be to prove that the stolen car 
was in their possession and that said defendants failed 
to make a satisfactory explanation. 'The respondents con-
tend that because of this possession and the defendant's 
failure to explain said posses·sion, a prima facie case of 
larceny has been proved. It is well established in the 
laws of the state of Utah by the section above quoted and 
also by decisions out of our Supreme Court that the 
elements of larceny in this~ type of case are ( 1) proof 
that the car in question was stolen; (2) that the defend-
ants were in possession, and (3) that said defendants 
failed to make a satisfactory explanation. (See State 
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vs. Converse, 40 Utah 72; and State vs. Bowen, -l-5 Utah 
130, 132.) 
As indicated above the respondents feel that ele-
ments one and three above quoted have been established, 
and the defendants make no contention to the contrary 
so that only the issue is whether or not the stolen auto-
mobile was actually in the possession of these defendants 
as contemplated by law. Possession, as defined by various 
courts including our own Utah court, is classified as any 
form of dominion, any form of control which is con-
sdous, personal, associated with some assertion of own-
ership and control-whether shown by substantial or 
direct evidence-any type of control or dominion which 
is unexplained and associated with conflicting statements 
as to possession. (See People vs. Gillis, 6 Utah 84; State 
vs. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529, 544; People vs. Chadwick 
7 Utah 134; State vs. Kinsley, 77 Utah 348; State vs. 
Russo, (Me.) 143 Atl. 99,100; State vs. Albertson (Iowa) 
220, N.W. 39, 40.) 
The respondents desire to point out that so far as 
possession is concerned, the following facts are very 
prominent in this case. These defendants were located 
on the premises where the stolen automobile was located 
and gave abs'olutely no satisfactory explanation as to 
why they were on said premises. It is apparent that 
they had removed one license plate and were in the 
process of removing the other license plate belonging to 
the Ford automobile. Also, which fact is without explana-
tion, that one of these plates belonging to the Ford auto-
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1nobile was found near the stolen automobile and that 
one of s~aid defendants was undoubtedly caught in the 
~ct of putting that plate ·on the stolen car at the time 
the officer arrived. Respondents contend that the de-
fendants by these efforts were in every respect con-
nected with the presence of a stolen car and that by the 
actions indicated they were conscious of its presence, 
were exercising dominion over it, made conflictir1g state-
Inents, and h~~ the actions further asserted rights over 
said stolen car. It is granted that to some extent the 
evidence is circumstantial but this is immaterial and is 
still considered admissable evidence. 
The respondents submit that these facts are suf-
ficient to support this verdict and respondents again 
emphasize that no attempt was made to explain why the 
defendants had the stolen car as indicated. We further 
submit that even though a defendant is not required to 
take the stand in his own defense and even though it is 
not to be used against him, this law particularly de-
mands an explanation and respondents feel that a failure 
to take the stand in this case is particularly evidence 
of a refusal or failure to meet the requirement~ of the 
law and a failure to make satisfactory explanation. 
The law is well settled in this state that the question 
of possession is a jury question. It is well settled that 
any jury verdict reasonably supported by evidence should 
not be disturbed; that in cases where reasonable minds 
may differ a jnry verdict shall stand. (See State v~. 
Gurr, 40 Utah 162. People vs. Swasey, 6 Utah 93; State 
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vs. Bowen, supra; State vs. Peterson; (Utah case) 174 
Pac. (2) 843, 845.) 
The defendants have called attention to State vs. 
"jforris, 70 Utah 570, as being a case in support of their 
contentions. The respondents desire to point out that 
this ease emphasizes the rules herein emphasized by the 
respondent's brief. The court pointed out that the Morris 
case merely contained evidence of n1ere possession with-
out proof of knowledge of the presence of the stolen 
sheep or any evidence whatsoever that the deefndant in 
that case had exercised any dominion or asserted any 
claims of a personal nature over these stolen animals. We 
do not feel that the case is in any sens1e in point. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent urges that the defendants had a fair 
trial in every respeet; that the evidence indicating pos-
session is sufficient; that the jury had an opportunity to 
weigh the evidence and observe the witnesses and that 
the jury verdict should not be disturbed. Respondent 
urges that the judgment of the trial court should he 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES 
Attorney Gen.e.ral 
C. N. OTTOSEN, 
Assista;nt Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
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